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NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina's "Necessary Expense" Limitation-Four Recent
Developments
Article VII, section 61 of the North Carolina Constitution pro-
vides:
No county, city, or other municipal corporation shall contract
any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be
levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the neces-
sary expenses thereof, unless approved by a majority of those who
shall vote thereon in any election held for such purpose.
2
In two recent decisions,' the North Carolina Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret this constitutional limitation 4 in relation to
four problems of real significance to those charged with the financial
administration of North Carolina municipalities and counties,
The issues dealt with in these two decisions may be categorized as
follows: (1) Are funds derived from the sale of municipal or
county property subject to the limitations of article VII, section 6?
(2) Are intangibles tax funds, which are levied and collected by
the State and returned to the local governments, subject to the
,,necessary expense" limitation? (3) Are municipal and county
contracts imposing future obligations "debts" within the purview
of this constitutional provision? (4) Does a particular "necessary
I Prior to the constitutional amendment adopted by a vote of the people
in the general election held November 6, 1962, this section was section 7 of
article VII.
' This constitutional provision has no counterpart in other jurisdictions;
therefore, interpretative aid in the form of decisions from other states is
practically nonexistent. The supreme court has explained this uniqueness in
these terms:
In defining "necessary expenses" we derive practically no aid from
the cases decided in other States. We have examined a large number
of such cases apparently related to the subject and in each one we have
found some fact or feature or constitutional or statutory provision an-
tagonistic to or at variance with the section under consideration. We must
rely upon our own decisions.
Henderson v. City of Wilmington, 191 N.C. 269, 277, 132 S.E. 25, 29
(1926).
'Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d 115
(1964); Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 136 S.E.2d 564 (1964).
'For a general discussion of the "necessary expense" limitation of article
VII, section 6, see Coats & Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses," 18 N.C.L.Rrv.
93 (1940); Note, 30 N.C.L.REv. 313 (1952).
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expense" lose its character as such when it is included, or pledged
to be included, within a category that, as an entity, is not a "neces-
sary expense," such as urban redevelopment?
I. FUNDS DERIVED FROM THE SALE OF PROPERTY
In Yokley v. Clark,5 the Town of Mount Airy and the County
of Surry had entered into a contract establishing a joint airport
authority.' The agreement provided for the construction of an
airport to be operated and maintained under the guidance of the
authority. The town and county agreed to make an initial financial
contribution and to provide such supplemental revenues as the
operation and maintenance of the facility might from time to time
require. As the construction and operation of an airport is not
a "necessary expense," 7 the town attempted to confine its initial
contribution to nontax funds. The Mount Airy Board of Commis-
sioners appropriated 25,000 dollars to the authority payable from
funds which were derived from the sale of old watershed property.
It was asserted that such funds were nontax revenues within the
purview of article VII, section 6.8
Taxpayers brought suit to restrain the town and county from
expending such funds because the proposal had not been submitted
to a referendum. From the lower court's decree validating the ap-
propriation, plaintiffs appealed.9
The supreme court held that the contract itself was a "debt"
and therefore a pledge of the faith and credit of both the town and
county contra to article VII, section 6.10 The court further con-
cluded that "in addition to the constitutional prohibition, there are
other serious questions involved." One of the serious questions
related to the lower court's finding that "money received from the
sale of watershed lands (paid for by taxes) becomes surplus funds
derived from a source other than [ad valorem] taxation." 2
-262 N.C. 218, 136 S.E.2d 564 (1964).
* N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-4 (1960) provides for the establishment of joint
airports by any city or town and county.
" Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1945); Sing v.
City of Charlotte, 213 N.C. 60, 195 S.E. 271 (1938); Goswick v. City of
Durham, 211 N.C. 687, 191 S.E. 728 (1937).
'Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 221, 136 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1964).
° Ibid.
'OId. at 222, 136 S.E.2d at 567.
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
2" Ibid.
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Justice Higgins, writing for the court, stated that this par-
ticular question had never been directly presented because, in most
cases, it had been precluded by stipulation or admission. 8 He
then quoted from an opinion by Justice Barnhill, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in 1945,"4 wherein he made the following
observation:
Ordinarily cities obtain funds with which to buy property
through taxation. When tax money is used to purchase property
legal sense derived from taxation. The conversion and recon-
version do not change its essential character as tax money.
15
As the case was reversed on other grounds,'" there was no
necessity for expressly accepting or rejecting the Barnhill rule, and
the quotation from and reference to his opinion was the extent of
the court's consideration of this particular problem in Yokley.
Thus, in a true legal sense, all that can be surmised from the decision
is that the court is aware that a serious constitutional question exists
when funds derived from the sale of property are used for "non-
necessary expense" purposes without a vote.
In light of the court's past practice, this awareness alone is sig-
nificant. Prior to Yokley, the court had acquiesced in the use of
such funds for "nonnecessary expenses" without a vote. Two
reasons may explain why the use of revenues from the sale of
property for "nonnecessary expenses" had not been questioned by
the court earlier.
First, beginning in 192517 the court followed a rule of interpre-
tation that had the ultimate effect of excepting from article VII,
section 6, certain cash transactions effected from funds on hand.
As stated by the court: "[T] his provision ... has no application to
the facts of this record, where, as stated, the funds to be applied
are already on hand and the proposed expenditure will impose no
further liability on the municipality, nor involve the imposition
of further taxation upon it."' 8 The record, referred to by the
28 Ibid.
1 4Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1945).
Id. at 18, 36 S.E.2d at 816. (Emphasis added.)
' The court reversed on the ground that the contract imposed future
obligations and therefore constituted a pledge of the faith and credit of the
two local governments. See section III of this text.
'Adams v. City of Durham, 189 N.C. 232, 126 S.E. 611 (1925).
118 Id. at 233, 126 S.E. at 612.
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court, reveals that the case involved the application of funds from
the sale of municipal property for a "nonnecessary expense."' 9
The result of this practice, which has been called the "surplus
fund rule,"20 was to prevent further inquiry into the nature of these
funds for purposes of determining the application of the constitu-
tional limitation. This was true not only in relation to funds derived
from the sale of property, but also those acquired directly from
taxation and which might have been carried over by the local govern-
ment as legitimate surplus from year to year.2 ' By 1960 the court
had stripped this practice of its glossing effect by taking a more
discriminating view of funds alleged to be surplus. The court
held that where an appropriation was for a "nonnecessary ex-
pense," payment could not be made from surplus funds derived from
taxation of any kind.22
The second factor, which had the effect of deferring considera-
tion of the constitutional status of conversion-reconversion funds,
was the court's acceptance of conclusory statements by local govern-
ments that funds derived from the sale of property were nontax
revenues. 23 Apparently, Justice Higgins had this in mind when he
9 The City of Durham applied funds derived from the sale of a municipal
building to the construction of a city auditorium, a "nonnecessary expense."
A taxpayer brought suit contesting the use of such funds on the grounds that
it was a violation of article VII, section 6. From an adverse decree in the
lower court, plaintiff appealed. The supreme court found no constitutional
issue on the asserted basis that such funds were surplus, and did not involve
the imposition of a debt or the levy of a tax. Adams v. City of Durham, 189
N.C. 232, 126 S.E. 611 (1925).
" Byrd, Dennis v. Raleigh, Popular Government, May 1961, pp. 1, 4.
For cases illustrating the effect of this rule, see Goswick v. City of Durham,
211 N.C. 687, 191 S.E. 728 (1937); Burleson v. Board of Aldermen, 200
N.C. 30, 156 S.E. 241 (1930); Mewborn v. City of Kinston, 199 N.C. 72,
154 S.E. 76 (1930); Nash v. City of Monroe, 198 N.C. 306, 151 S.E. 634
(1930); Holmes v. City of Fayetteville; 197 N.C. 740, 150 S.E. 624 (1929);
Hall v. Redd, 196 N.C. 622, 146 S.E. 583 (1929).21 Byrd, supra note 20, at 4 & n.19.
22Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116 S.E.2d 923 (1960). For
a general discussion of the repercussions of Dennis on the "surplus
fund rule," see Byrd, supra note 20. Cf. Sing v. City of Charlotte, 213 N.C.
60, 195 S.E. 271 (1938).
"In Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1945),
plaintiff airport authority brought an action for mandamus to compel the
defendants, the respective treasurers of the City of High Point and Guilford
County, to turn over to the authority certain appropriations made by their
governing bodies. The City of High Point had adopted a budget containing
an appropriation to the airport authority for the sum of $25,000, such funds
"derived from the sale of properties and unappropriated surplus revenues
from sources other than the levy of ad valorem taxes which are not pledged
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stated that stipulation and admission had, in the majority of the
cases, removed the question from controversy. Justice Barnhill,
in 1945, was the first to question the acceptance of such statements
as fact:
Is this a stipulation of fact that the property sold was not pur-
chased with tax money, or an erroneous conclusion that proceeds
from the sale of property which was acquired through taxation
are not derived from ad valorem taxes. It is not clear the parties
meant the first. It would seem to be the latter. In any event
it is left in serious doubt and for that reason plaintiff has not
shown a clear legal right to this appropriation.24
While this statement is not set out in Yokley, the court does allude
to the fact that Justice Barnhill considered such statements to be
mere conclusions of law.25
Prior to Yokley, these earlier decisions were susceptible to an
interpretation indicating that funds from the sale of property
were not subject to the constitutional limitation. Even when viewed
with hindsight, they seem to have obscured the question of the con-
stitution's application to such funds for officials who had to make
initial decisions concerning their expenditure. When viewed in this
context, the real significance of Yokley seems to be that for the first
time the court has displayed a willingness to cast off this subterfuge
and to recognize the existence of a real constitutional issue. Stand-
ing alone, Yokley is no authority for the proposition that the Barn-
hill test has been adopted as the law in North Carolina. It does,
however, furnish a strong inference that the court will closely
scrutinize any future expenditure of funds derived from the sale
of property for a "nonnecessary expense."
Fortunately, Yokley is not the final word on this "serious ques-
tion." In Horton v. Redevelopment Commn,26 decided only one
or otherwise applicable by law to the payment of the existing debt of the
City of High Point." Id. at 4, 36 S.E.2d at 806. Defendants appealed from
a judgment by the trial court for the airport authority. The court avoided
a decision on the question of funds derived from the sale of property by
relying on stipulations made by the parties: "It is within the stipulated
facts that the several appropriations made to the plaintiff are out of funds
now in their hands, in each case not derived from ad valorem taxes, but
mainly from the sale of property... ." Id. at 8, 36 S.E.2d at 808. (Emphasis
added.)
2,Id. at 19, 36 S.E.2d at 816.
' Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 223, 136 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1964).26262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d 115 (1964).
[Vol. 43-
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month subsequent to Yokley, the city proposed to donate certain
parcels of land to an urban redevelopment project. Urban redevelop-
ment has been held to be a "nonnecessary expense.""7 In terms of the
mechanical concept-conversion-reconversion-the donation of prop-
erty can be distinguished from a situation, such as that in Yokley,
where the funds from the sale of property are used for "nonneces-
sary expense" purposes. Moreover, there is no indication in Horton
that the land sought to be donated was surplus property, i.e., no
longer used for the purpose for which it was acquired. The court
seemingly attached no significance to the latter distinction. It held
that no decision could be made as to the validity of a financial plan
for an urban redevelopment project, unless and until it had been
ascertained whether the property proposed to be donated had been
acquired from tax money.28 The Horton decision is important
in that it relies on Yokley and uses languages strongly indicative
of the rule set out by Justice Barnhill: "The City is without authority
to donate the land referred to . . . for credit under the Redevelop-
ment Plan... unless that land was procured by the City from funds
other than from ad valorem taxation."29
The rule that has evolved through these two recent cases can
perhaps be stated as follows: The court will presume that municipal
and county property was acquired from tax funds. In any proposed
use of such property for a "nonnecessary expense" purpose, the local
government must first ascertain if such land was acquired from tax
money; if so, no use of the property can be made except in ac-
cordance with article VII, section 6. Furthermore, a "serious
question" exists as to the constitutionality of treating funds derived
from the sale of such property as nontax revenues.
Even as the law stands today, it would be wise for the munici-
palities and counties of North Carolina to treat funds derived
from the sale of property as tax revenues, rather than to rely on the
distinction between Yokley and Horton. Because the language in
Horton is strongly suggestive of the Barnhill test, it seems unlikely
that the court will distinguish between the use of the property itself
"'Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259 N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464
(1963).8 Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 320-21, 137 S.E.2d
115, 125-26 (1964).20 Ibid.
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for a "nonnecessary expense" and the use of the funds derived from
the sale thereof.
II. INTANGIBLES TAX FUNDS3O
In Yokley, the court dealt with another problem relating to the
general concept of nontax funds, or funds not subject to the
"necessary expense" limitation. As already stated, both the town
and county attempted to provide their initial contributions under
the joint contract from nontax funds in order to avoid a confronta-
tion with article VII, section 6. Along with the town's appropria-
tion of funds to the authority from the sale of watershed property,
the county appropriated 25,000 dollars " 'to be paid out of any non
Ad Valorem tax revenues available such [as] beer tax and wine
tax revenues or intangibles tax revenue due the General Fund ....' "31
The supreme court held: "The County may not treat intangibles
tax receipts as surplus funds, notwithstanding the fact that the
State collects the tax and makes distribution to the counties and
towns."3' The court relied on section 105-198 of the General
Statutes, which provides that intangibles taxes are levied "for and on
behalf of said political subdivisions of the State to the same extent and
manner as if said levies were made by the governing authorities of
said subdivisions for distribution therein."33 Therefore, since article
VII, section 6 applies to all local taxes, intangibles tax funds must
be expended only as tax revenues. 4
Yokley is the first decision to consider the intangibles personal
"O The Intangibles Personal Property Tax is levied and collected by the
State on bank deposits; money in safe deposit boxes, safes, and cash registers;
accounts receivable; bonds and notes; all evidences of debt; stocks and bene-
ficial interests in foreign trusts; and funds on deposit with insurance com-
panies. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-198 to -205 (1958, Supp. 1963). From the
total levy by the State, an amount is deducted, as determined by the State
Board of Assessments, sufficient to defray the cost of administration for the
fiscal year. The funds are then distributed to the counties and municipalities
in proportion to the total amount of ad valorem taxes levied by each during
the fiscal year preceding distribution. The amounts so allocated to each local
unit are apportioned in proportion to other property tax levies made for
the various funds of the taxing units receiving the funds from the State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-213 (1958). Through special enabling legislation,
the municipality or county may treat the intangibles revenues as part of
its general fund.
" Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 221, 136 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1964).
32 Id. at 223, 136 S.E.2d at 568.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-198 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
S' Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116 S.E.2d 923 (1960).
[Vol. 43
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property tax in relation to article VII, section 6.3' Prior to Yokley,
it had been said that the question of whether the "necessary ex-
pense" limitation would apply to such funds was debatable."8 The
holding in Yokley raises two very interesting questions. First,
was the intangibles tax intended and has it been treated by the
legislature as a local tax? Second, is the intangibles tax, in fact,
a local tax?
The original intangibles tax schedule was enacted as a part
of the Revenue Act of 19 3 7 ." Article VIII of this act included
the following declaration: "Intangible personal properties defined
and classified by this chapter . . . are hereby segregated for ex-
clusive State taxation after the year one thousand nine hundred
thirty-seven . . . ."s The act also declared that "taxes levied in
this article [are] for the maintenance of the public schools of the
'State, under authority of section six, Article V, of the Constitu-
tion." 9 In the only decision construing this original enactment, it
was said:
By this declaration the General Assembly apparently en-
deavored to avoid the suggestion of exceeding the general limita-
tion placed by ... [article V, section 6] upon its taxing power
upon property, and to levy the tax as one within the proviso
which excepts from the limitation taxes for the maintenance of
the public schools of the State for the constitutional period.40
Thus, both legislative and judicial declarations sustain the con-
clusion that the original tax schedule was a state levy. It was not
" The intangibles personal property article of the Revenue Act of 1937
was considered by the court in relation to another problem in Board of
Educ. v. Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 1 S.E.2d 544 (1939). Cf. Town of
Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 362, 2 S.E.2d 463, 475 (1939)
(dissenting opinion).
" Byrd, supra note 20, at 3 & n.16.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, §§ 700-16.
38 N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, § 700.
38 Ibid.
"Board of Educ. v. Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 218, 1 S.E.2d 544,
545 (1939). Article V, section 6 provides:
The total of the State and county tax on property shall not exceed
twenty cents on the one hundred dollars value of property, except when
the county property tax is levied for a special purpose and with the
special approval of the General Assembly, which may be done by special
or general act: Provided, this limitation shall not apply to taxes levied for
the maintenance of the public schools of the State for the term required
by article nine, section three, of the Constitution: Provided, further, the
State tax shall not exceed five cents on the one hundred dollars value of
property. (Emphasis added.)
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until 1939 that article VIII of the Revenue Act of 1937 was
amended to include the language of what is now General Statutes
section 105-198.41 Consequently, the proper inquiry would seem
to be: did the legislature, by this amendment, intend to change
what was ordained as a state tax into a local one insofar as the
amounts returned to the local units were concerned?
The language of section 105-198 is clear. Ostensibly, it mani-
fests a clear intent that the tax should, for all intents and pur-
poses, be dealt with as though it were levied by the local units. In
addition to this declaration, there is another indication that the
funds returned to the local governments were intended by the legis-
lature to be treated as local tax funds. The original 1937 enact-
ment provided:
The amounts distributed to the counties and cities of the
state shall be used for the payment of principal or interest on
indebtedness or expenses incurred on account of providing facili-
ties and equipment necessary for the maintenance of the constitu-
tional six months public school term.42
This requirement was consistent with the design of the tax as
originally enacted. But in 1939, section 715 of the intangibles
tax schedule was amended to provide that "the amounts so allo-
cated to each county and municipality [shall be used] in proportion
to other property tax levies made for the various funds and ac-
tivities of the taxing unit receiving said allotment. 43 By removing
the former requirement that local units expend intangibles tax
funds only for public school purposes, the legislature gave sub-
stance to its earlier declaration. Beginning in 1939, the local gov-
ernments could apply such funds in the same manner as any other
locally levied and collected tax revenue.
The argument that the intangibles tax is really a state tax
appears to emanate from two facts. First, the intangibles tax is
actually levied and collected by the State.4 Second, the entire
amount collected was not returned to the political subdivisions until
1957.45 As initially enacted, the intangibles tax schedule required
that only fifty per cent of the total amount collected be returned to
"1 N.C. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 158, § 700.
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, § 715.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 158, § 715.
"See note 30 supra.
,N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1340, § 9.
[Vol. 4;3
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the counties and municipalities.4" By a series of amendments, be-
ginning in 1939, the distribution ratio was changed with the local
units receiving more each time." In 1957, General Statutes section
105-213 was amended to require that the State return the total
amount of such revenues, less administrative costs, to the local gov-
ernments.48 Thus, from the standpoint of the total tax structure, it
could be argued that until 1957 the legislature had treated the tax
as a state levy. This argument would appear to have a good deal of
merit if it were not for the clear legislative intent, manifested by
the 1939 amendments, to sever the amount returned to the local
units from the total tax structure and to provide that it be utilized
as a local tax fund.
Regardless of the fact that the history of the intangibles per-
sonal property tax may provide some support for a contention that
it is a state tax, the question may be raised: at the time of Yokley,
was the intangibles tax, in fact, a local tax? The answer would
seem to be in the affirmative for two reasons. First, the tax is on
property that is within the local taxing unit and, in this sense, can-
not be distinguished from the real property tax. Second, it is
now completely refunded to such local units. In reality, the only
indicia of a state tax remaining is that the State levies and collects
the tax.
In conclusion, it would seem that the Yokley holding on the
intangibles tax question is sustainable both from the standpoint of
its legislative history and from the present reality of the tax struc-
ture. From the historical point of view, the 1939 legislation
demonstrates a clear intent that the funds be regarded as local
revenues. From the standpoint of practicality, there is no sub-
stantial distinction between the intangibles personal property tax
and any other locally levied and collected tax.
III. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS IMPOSING FUTURE OBLIGATIONS
The contract in Yokley, in addition to obligating the two gov-
ernmental units to make an initial contribution, also provided that
after revenues derived from the operation of the facility had been
applied "further expenses of operation and maintenance [would]
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 127, § 715.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 158, § 715 (60%-40%); N.C. Sess. Laws
1941, ch. 50, § 8 (75%-25%); N.C. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 501, § 7 (80%-
20%).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1340, § 7.
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be on the basis of sixty ... per cent contributions by the Town...
and forty . per cent by the County . . . . 49 The supreme court
held the contract to be void as a pledge of the faith and credit of
both local governments for a "nonnecessary expense" purpose with-
out a vote. Justice Higgins laid down the following rule:
[T]he Constitution forbids contracting the debt or pledging
the credit of the Town and County without a vote. The making
of the pledge for future fulfillment is unauthorized. The method
by which payment was intended, whether by taxation or other-
wise, is immaterial, if for an unnecessary purpose.50
The facts in Yokley make two things clear. First, the future
obligations imposed by the contract were unlimited both as to time
and amount; moreover, there was no qualification that potential
obligations be restricted to nontax funds.5" Second, an application of
the standard definition of municipal indebtedness would have been
sufficient to hold the contract to be a pledge of the faith and credit
of both local units contra to article VII, section 6.52 This means,
in effect, that the part of the Yokley opinion that precludes the in-
currence of future obligations, no matter how they are to be dis-
charged, may be regarded as dictum.
Perhaps the most important question raised by the Yokley case
can be stated as follows: are the municipality and county precluded
from entering into a contract requiring future appropriations, with-
out first submitting the contract to a vote, when such appropriations
are expressly limited to nontax funds in general, or to a specific
and designated nontax fund? This question assumes that the ob-
jective of the contract is a "nonnecessary expense" purpose. It
"' Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 220, 136 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1964).5o Id. at 222, 136 S.E.2d at 567. (Emphasis added.)
51 The town and county did make an abortive effort to confine their initial
obligations to nontax funds. The trial judge had made his determination
of the constitutional question only in relation to these purported nontax
revenues, apparently attaching no significance to the future obligations.
Noting this fact, Justice Higgins said: "The contract to build, and to operate
... is indivisible. The judge is without power to eliminate the objections
by confining the operating expenses to nontax receipts. In the first place,
the parties do not limit their commitment." Id. at 222, 136 S.E.2d at 567.
2 Municipal indebtedness has been defined by the court to mean the
following: "'An indebtedness within restrictions upon municipal indebted-
ness is an agreement of some kind by the municipality to pay money where
no suitable provision has been made for the prompt discharge of the obliga-
tion imposed by the agreement'." Williamson v. City of High Point, 213
N.C. 96, 104, 195 S.E. 90, 95 (1938); Brockenbrough v. Board of Water
Comm'rs, 134 N.C. 1, 11-12, 46 S.E. 28, 31. (1903).
[Vol. 43
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would seem that the Yokley rule envisions any contract imposing
future obligations regardless of the contemplated method of financ-
ing; but since the uncompromising language of the opinion could be
regarded as dictum, a legitimate question exists as to the potential
application of the rule.
Some light is shed upon the scope of the Yokley rule in Horton.
5 3
Here, taxpayers of the City of High Point brought suit to restrain
the institution of an urban redevelopment project54 on the grounds,
among others, that there was no valid financial plan as required by
law.55 Specifically, it was alleged that tax funds were to be ex-
pended, debts contracted, and the faith of the city pledged to finance
a project that was not a "necessary expense." 5 The financial plan
presented by the city consisted of a cooperation agreement between
the city and its redevelopment commission. 7 This agreement pro-
vided that the city was to effect certain capital improvements within
the project area over a period of years.5 s These improvements,
along with certain other contributions, were to constitute local
grants-in-aid pursuant to an arrangement with the federal govern-
ment, whereby it was to provide two-thirds of the net cost of the
project. Final payment of the federal government was contingent
upon the city's providing one-third of the net cost or making spe-
cific provision therefor.59
There is no evidence that the validity of the financial plan was
controverted on the grounds that the cooperation agreement itself
" Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d 115
(1964).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-454 to -496 provides a comprehensive scheme
whereby North Carolina cities can redevelop their blighted areas through
the institution of urban redevelopment projects. "Blighted area" is defined
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-456(2) (1964).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. 160-463(d) (7) (1964).
"° Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 309, 137 S.E.2d 115,
118 (1964).
"' Urban redevelopment commissions may be created by the governing
bodies of North Carolina cities as instruments for urban redevelopment
within the territorial limits of the city. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-457 (1964).
The powers of such commissions are set out in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-462
(1964).
"8 Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 318, 137 S.E.2d 115,
124 (1964). The improvements were to be made on or before December
31, 1967, and consisted of street improvements, traffic controls, water and
sewer lines, electric distribution lines, a series of parks, off-street parking
facilities, and a pedestrian plaza development. Ibid. For a discussion of these
improvements, see section IV.
1° Id. at 314, 137 S.E.2d at 121.
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constituted a pledge of the faith and credit of the city as defined
by Yokley. There would seem to be some doubt as to whether
the agreement did, in fact, impose a legal obligation on the city."0
A majority of the court remanded the case for further findings."'
Justice Higgins, although concurring in the results, felt that the
cooperation agreement did constitute a debt and therefore a pledge
of the faith and credit of the city. He said:
The City ... plans to pay for said capital improvements by ap-
propriations made from year to year from currently available
non-tax revenues. The pledge is for payment out of future re-
ceipts and not from presently available funds. Article VII,
Section 6, of the State Constitution forbids the expenditure
of tax funds for unnecessary purposes without voter approval.
It likewise prevents a pledge of the City's faith and credit to be
fulfilled by future receipts, regardless of the source.0 2
In light of Justice Higgins's reliance on the Yokley rule, the
majority opinion is revealing. For whatever reason, the majority
did not follow Yokley in regard to the cooperation agreement. Chief
Justice Denny made the following observation concerning the agree-
ment: "It is apparent ... that the City is financially able to provide
the local grants-in-aid contemplated under the Plan and the Coopera-
tion Agreement from current nontax revenues of the City ap-
propriated from year to year through 31 December 1967 . . .
If the agreement imposed a legal obligation upon the city to make the
improvements agreed upon, it would certainly seem that Horton
presented a contractural situation squarely within the purview of
The agreement contained the following covenant:
[T]he obligation of the City .. .shall terminate and become null
and void to the extent that the City is unable to finance its participating
share by appropriations made from year to year from currently available
non-tax revenues, revenue bonds which do not pledge the faith and
credit of the City, and by credit for other expenditures from lawfully
available sources.
Record, p. 98, Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 262 N.C. 306, 137 S.E.2d
115 (1964).
" The court required additional findings of fact in relation to four
items which were part of the city's financial plan: (1) the donation of land
(see section I of this text) ; (2) off-street parking facilities; (3) proposed
school construction to be made within the project area by Guilford County;
(4) a pedestrian plaza development; (5) other items alleged by the city
to be "nonnecessary expenses" and public purposes. 262 N.C. at 321-23, 137
S.E.2d at 126-27.02 Id. at 327, 137 S.E.2d at 130.
011Id. at 323, 137 S.E.2d at 127.
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the Yokley rule. But if there was no legal obligation on the city
to make the improvements contemplated by the agreement, then
Justice Higgins would appear to have been wrong in his reliance
upon Yokley.
It is clear from Horton that Justice Higgins considers the Yokley
rule to be without exception where the contract imposes future
obligations for a "nonnecessary expense" purpose. If the majority
had chosen to follow the Yokley decision, it would have meant that
all other questions relating to the urban redevelopment project, and
its contemplated schemes of finance, would have become moot,
unless and until the cooperation agreement was submitted to a vote.
The language in Yokley, insofar as it prevents the incurrence
of future obligations regardless of how they are to be discharged,
calls to mind a well known exception to constitutional debt limita-
tions known as the "special fund doctrine."'  In a more limited
sense, it is called the "revenue bond exception." 65 In 1903, North
Carolina recognized a version of the special fund doctrine in relation
to certain proprietary undertakings by local governments., 6 The
court held that where a city issued revenue bonds, the proceeds of
which were to be used in expanding and improving the city's water
and sewer systems, with the principal and interest on such bonds
being payable solely from revenue derived from the operation of the
systems, then such bonds did not constitute "debts" within the
purview of article VII, section 6.67 North Carolina has not ex-
tended the special fund doctrine beyond proprietary undertakings of
municipalities. But it has been said that North Carolina recog-
nizes the "broad special fund doctrine" as contrasted to the restricted
view."'
""If an obligation is payable out of a special fund only, and the
municipality is not otherwise liable, it is generally held that there is no in-
debtedness .. C.." McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2387 (2nd ed.
1928).
" The term "revenue bond" exception seems to be used primarily where
bonds are issued to pay for waterworks, light plants, and other proprietary
undertakings by a municipality when such bonds are payable solely from
the income of such works. See id. § 2390.
" Brockenbrough v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 134 N.C. 1, 46 S.E. 28(1903).
'
1 Ibid.
See Hoyt & Fordham, Constitutional Restrictions upon Public Debt
in North Carolina, 16 N.C.L.RIv. 329, 346-47 (1938). As defined in this
article, the "broad special fund doctrine" means that no debt is created where
the special fund is derived from the net non-tax revenues of a particular
municipal proprietary undertaking. On the other hand, the "restricted special
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It is conceivable that the supreme court, when faced with a
situation forcing the issue, could recognize the validity of contracts,
such as that in Horton, that impose future obligations limited to
nontax funds by relying on the analogy suggested by the special fund
doctrine. Admittedly, this would be quite an expansion of the doc-
trine as now recognized, but in both instances, it could be argued that
the municipality incurs no general liability and that the discharge of
future obligations is limited to a nontax source. In context of the
special fund doctrine, such a recognition would not seem to be
unduly subverting article VII, section 6.
Until the court has had occasion to properly delineate the area
covered by Yokley, no municipal or county official should, in good
conscience, disregard its broad implications. It is hoped that the
court will clarify the confusion that exists as a result of the Horton
case and the concurring opinion by Justice Higgins. It is suggested
that the "special fund" analogy provides at least a substantive
foundation on which to base a recognition of contracts imposing
future obligations for "nonnecessary expenses" without requiring
that they first be submitted to a referendum.
IV. NECESSARY ExPENSES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
In Horton the cooperation agreement between the city and its
redevelopment commission provided that certain improvements were
to be made within the project area on or before a certain date in
1967.69 Of these improvements, only traffic controls, water and
sewer lines, electric distribution facilities, and street improvements
were "necessary expenses." 70  Urban redevelopment, although a
valid public purpose, is not a "necessary expense" of the munici-
pality. 1 The taxpayers alleged that the financial plan promulgated
fund doctrine" means that the special fund must arise solely from the net
revenues of the specific properties paid for by the proceeds of the obliga-
tions. Ibid. See, e.g., State Ports Authority v. First Citizens Bank and
Trust Co., 242 N.C. 416, 88 S.E.2d 109 (1955); Williamson v. City of High
Point, 213 N.C. 96, 195 S.E. 90 (1938).
" See note 58 supra.
'0262 N.C. at 318, 137 S.E.2d at 124 (1964).
7'Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259 N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464
(1963).
The ultimate result, which our Urban Redevelopment Law . . . seeks
to achieve, is to eliminate the injurious consequences caused by a blighted
area in a municipality and to substitute for them a use of the area
which it is hoped will render impossible future blight and its injurious
consequences. This is in its broad purpose a preventive measure. . ..
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by the commission was unconstitutional because certain proposed
expenditures had not been submitted to a vote in accordance with
article VII, section 6.72
The supreme court was confronted with this dilemma: do
"necessary expenses" forfeit their character as such from the mere
fact of their inclusion within an urban redevelopment project? The
court held that
the fact that a municipality constructs streets, lays water and
sewer lines, installs traffic controls and electric facilities within an
urban redevelopment area, will not change such construction and
installations front a necessary to an unnecessary expense of the
municipality.7 3
Conceivably, the court could have taken a much more restrictive
approach by holding that such improvements became absorbed in
the ultimate objective for which they were to be made and thus
should be regarded as any other expense incurred in putting into
effect an urban redevelopment plan.
The High Point project illustrates two important consequences
of the Horton decision. First, the process by which vital federal
funds can be obtained is greatly facilitated. The arrangement be-
tween the redevelopment commission and the federal government
provided that the latter would defray two-thirds of the net cost
of the project, with final payment being contingent upon the city's
providing one-third of such net cost, or making specific provision
therefor.74 Consequently, by making provision for a large portion
of the city's obligation to be discharged through "necessary ex-
pense" improvements, the city is able to present the federal govern-
[T]he expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by a municipality in putting
into effect an urban redevelopment plan, pursuant to the authority vested
in it by our Urban Redevelopment Law, are . . . not "necessary ex-
penses" within the purview of Article VII, section 7 [6 as amended],
of the North Carolina Constitution.
Id. at 611, 131 S.E.2d at 468.
" 262 N.C. at 319, 137 S.E.2d at 124 (1964).
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
' A written agreement was entered into, and the Government agreed to
provide two-thirds of the net cost of effecting the plan and it is provided
therein that the additional one-third of the net cost of effecting the plan
will be provided ed [sic] through local grants-in-aid. It is specifically
provided in the agreement that the Government will not make the final
payment on account of the Project Capital Grant until local Grants-in-aid
equalling one-third of the net project cost have been made or specific
provision therefor has been made.
Id. at 314, 137 S.E.2d at 121.
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ment with an incontestable financial plan, i.e., not open to the charge
that tax money will be expended without a vote.
Before any urban redevelopment project can be undertaken, the
redevelopment commission must prepare a complete and compre-
hensive plan.75 This plan must be submitted to and approved by the
governing body of the municipality wherein the project lies.70 One
of the vital requirements of such a plan is that it shall include a
"statement of the estimated cost and method of financing of ac-
quisition of the redevelopment area, and all other costs necessary
to prepare the area for redevelopment . . . . The court has held
that this requirement must be rigidly observed, even to the extent
that petitions for condemnation of property within the project area
must allege the existence of a valid financial plan.78 A city is now
assured of a valid method of financing its project insofar as its
obligations are to be in the form of grants-in-aid consisting of im-
provements, deemed "necessary expenses,"79 within the redevelop-
ment area. Likewise, the fact that such proposed expenditures have
not been submitted to a vote, and are to be effected from tax funds,
does not make the financial plan invalid.
The aforementioned consequences of Horton upon the immediate
concept of urban redevelopment are merely illustrative of the possi-
bilities inherent in the liberal rule. In the context of the court's
past attitude toward urban redevelopment, this decision could be
regarded as having a much broader significance. Although the
North Carolina Urban Redevelopment Law is of fairly recent
11N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-463 (1964).
'N.C. Gm. STAT. § 160-463(g) (1964).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-463(d)(7) (1964).
'S Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391
(1962).
The adoption of the plan is equivalent to a cease and desist order
preventing any development, rental, or sale of the property within the
area. In order that property owners may be protected against threatened
taking which is never consummated, the act wisely requires a showing
that the acquiring agency has a lawful plan by which, among other
things, it may lawfully finance the whole area. Each landowner has the
right to know that the taking agency has on hand the money to pay for
his property or, in lieu thereof, has present authority to obtain it.
Id. at 224, 128 S.E.2d at 394.
" For a summary of those municipal and county expenditures that have
been held by the court to be "necessary expenses," see Coates & Mitchell,
"Necessary Expenses," 18 N.C.L.Rv. 93 (1940). The decisions are sum-
marized and brought up to date in Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 259
N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464 (1963).
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origin, and the decisions construing it relatively few,80 it cannot be
said that the court has taken a hostile attitude toward the idea; nor
can it be said that the court has tendered a hand of guidance. It
would seem that the Horton decision represents a more positive
approach to urban redevelopment in that a constitutional provision,
admitting of a strict construction, is liberally construed to allow a
wide lattitude in financing redevelopment projects.
In Horton, the interpretation of the "necessary expense" limi-
tation was confined to the area of urban redevelopment, and it re-
mains to be seen what application the rule will have outside of that
immediate area. If it is followed without discretion, it could become
a virulent means of circumventing article VII, section 6.81 Loosely
defined categories are not hard to find, and public projects are not
often divisible into one expenditure or even one "necessary expense."
There should be some point at which the court will look to the sub-
stance and not the label, thus preventing a direct evasion of the con-
stitutional limitation.
RONALD W. HOWELL
80Exclusive of the case considered in this comment, the North Carolina
Urban Redevelopment Law has been interpreted only three times. The
constitutionality of the law was first challenged in Redevelopment Comm'n
v. Security Nat'l Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960). Here it
was held that the taking of land for urban redevelopment was a valid exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain for a public purpose, and not in con-
travention of article I, section 1. It was also held that the law did not
permit an unlawful delegation of legislative power to municipalities and
their redevelopment commissions. In Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 258
N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962), the court reaffirmed the principles set out
in Security Nat'l Bank, but held that the standards and requirements set
out in the urban redevelopment law must be strictly adhered to. The question
of whether urban redevelopment constituted a "necessary expense" was
expressly reserved for future decision. In Horton v. Redevelopment Comm'n,
259 N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464 (1963), the court resolved the issue raised in
Hagins, by holding that urban redevelopment, although a valid public pur-
pose, did not constitute a "necessary expense." See note 72 supra.
"A simple example illustrates conceivable application of this rule.
Parks and playgrounds and other recreational facilities are not "necessary
expense" purposes. But if the situation is envisioned wherein a munici-
pality proposes to establish a park and recreational area consisting primarily
of streets, water fountains, rest room facilities, lighting, and police pro-
tection, such projects being "necessary expenses," then it would seem
inevitable that the city could finance such an area from tax funds without
submitting the proposal to a vote. This could be accomplished simply by
strategically allocating such improvements in such a manner that they
fall within the desired area.
19651
